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Tribute to Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
William J. Brennan, Jr.*
"I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue," wrote the
poet John Milton, "unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies
out and sees her adversary."1 The writer of a tribute to Leon Hig-
ginbotham suffers no such inhibition, for Judge Higginbotham has
indeed "sallied out" and engaged the world. He has undertaken a
remarkable range of activities-for the most part, happily, in the
public sphere: as skillful jurist, probing scholar, dedicated teacher,
and indeed a kind of conscience for the legal profession, prodding
us to remember law's responsibilities to those whom law once op-
pressed. All of us are richer for Judge Higginbotham's work, and
it is thus a pleasure to join in this expression of appreciation for a
good friend and gifted colleague.
There is much that is special about Judge Higginbotham's
opinions: their exposition is clear--often eloquent, their tone is
measured, their legal analysis is meticulous and thorough. The
thoroughness bespeaks several admirable qualities: a mastery of
doctrine, an awareness of subtleties, a belief in law's capacity to re-
solve problems, and a desire to place legal results in context. But
it is not only for craftsmanship that Judge Higginbotham's opin-
ions are held in such high regard. They are rightly esteemed, as
well, for their legal insights. These insights are the product of a
keen mind, an empathetic spirit, and broad experience.
When he joined the federal judiciary, Leon Higginbotham
brought with him an experience of American life that other col-
leagues could not possess. His mother (as he tells us) "was a vic-
tim of [rural Virginia's] worst racist and economic policies . . .
[who] did not get past the seventh grade"; his father was a second
generation factory worker in Trenton.2 Their hopes for a better
future were transmitted to their son who, through determination
* Associate Justice (Ret.), United States Supreme Court. Justice Brennan
served as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, on which Judge
Higginbotham sits, from 1956 to 1990.
1. John Milton, Areopagitica 45 (Edward Arber ed. 1925) (spelling
modernized).
2. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Dream With Its Back Against the Wall,
Yale L. Rep., Spring 1990, at 34.
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and talent, achieved success in a virtually all-white college, in a
virtually all-white law school, at the virtually all-white bar of Phil-
adelphia, and on the virtually all-white bench of the Third Circuit.
I mention Judge Higginbotham's background not for the
usual reason of marvelling at the barriers he overcame but simply
to note that this experience has enriched his work as lawyer,
teacher, writer, and judge. For he has brought to each of these
roles a rare combination of sensibilities: the analytic disposition of
a lawyer and the personal awareness of discrimination's sad legacy.
That dual perspective, I think, has made him particularly ad-
ept at reviewing claims in the difficult areas of equal protection
law. Adjudicating civil rights suits requires sensitivity, insight, and
a firm sense of not only the scope but the limits of legal doctrine.
Judge Higginbotham possesses all of these qualities; I note here
only a few cases that illustrate those qualities in diverse settings.
Two cases, for example, reflect the sometimes small insights
that can nevertheless be crucial in evaluating an individual plain-
tiff's claim. In Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh,3 a black attor-
ney alleged discrimination in his loss of a job. Writing for a
unanimous panel reversing a summary judgment, Judge Higgin-
botham rejected the view that a plaintiff's deposition, "because it
is his only record evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine fac-
tual issue on the ultimate question of race discrimination." 4 Not-
ing the realities of the workplace, Judge Higginbotham observed:
[m]uch of the discrimination that remains resists legal attack
exactly because it is so difficult to prove. Discrimination vic-
tims often come to the legal process without witnesses and
with little direct evidence indicating the precise nature of the
wrongs they have suffered. That is one of the reasons why our
legal system permits discrimination plaintiffs to "prove [their]
case[s] by direct or circumstantial evidence." 5
The same awareness of workplace realities informed Judge
Higginbotham's decision in Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corporation,6
which reversed summary judgment against an age discrimination
claim. The issue in Coventry was whether the plaintiff, who was
required to waive his discrimination claim as a condition for re-
ceiving a pension, did so voluntarily. Judge Higginbotham recog-
nized the "Hobson's choice" that confronts a worker who must
choose between accrued employment benefits, on which he de-
3. 826 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
4. 826 F.2d at 235.
5. Id. at 236 (citation omitted).
6. 856 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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pends, and legal rights of which he may be unsure.7 The decision
held that, when an employee waives his rights in such circum-
stances, courts must satisfy themselves that the employee not only
understood that he signed a waiver but also had a "meaningful
comprehension of the legal significance of a release of [his] claims
18
In the two cases just mentioned, Judge Higginbotham re-
versed a lower court decision, but he has proved willing to subject
his own judgment to the same scrutiny. An example is Green v.
USX Corp.,9 involving a Title VII challenge to a steel company's
hiring practices. That case reached the Supreme Court, but we re-
manded for further review in light of a new precedent affecting
disparate impact claims.10 On remand, Judge Higginbotham found
the precedent not applicable but reversed himself on a separate
ruling in the case that had upheld the disparate treatment claim.
He recognized that the hiring practice had an unfair impact on mi-
norities but concluded that plaintiffs could no longer demonstrate
the employer's improper motive, given the Supreme Court's "im-
position of an increasing burden of proof on civil rights plaintiffs
.... ,," It is a rare judge who reassesses his fidelity to changing
doctrine, but Judge Higginbotham noted that the court's "obliga-
tion to the parties... require[s] us on remand to correct what we
now think the Supreme Court would consider to be a significant
error in our original opinion."12
In Wilmington United Neighborhoods v. United States,'3
Judge Higginbotham held for a divided panel that Congress had
barred judicial review of locational decisions for medical facilities,
even if those decisions adversely affected civil rights. Judge Hig-
ginbotham was "not unmindful" of the impact of the decision on
the "weak and the poor . . .[as] options for the inner city are re-
duced by moving major centers or services to the suburbs . ... ,14
Yet, after a thorough analysis of a complicated statute, he con-
cluded that Congress intended its overriding purpose of reducing
health care costs (by shielding health care providers from litiga-
tion) to prevail.15
Similarly, in Business Association of University City v. Lan-
7. Id. at 524.
8. Id. at 525.
9. 896 F.2d 801 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 53 (1990).
10. USX Corp. v. Green, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989).
11. 896 F.2d at 806.
12. Id. at 806 nk.
13. 615 F.2d 112 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980).




drieu,16 Judge Higginbotham rejected the claim that the location
of new low-income housing would contravene federal law by exac-
erbating the concentration of minorities in Philadelphia. Ac-
knowledging the plaintiffs' good faith in seeking to integrate other
neighborhoods, Judge Higginbotham nevertheless concluded that,
"under the guise of . . .concern about the poor," the suit would
"push the doctrine of integrated housing . .. beyond the limit of
the logic of any of our prior cases, [or] any civil rights statutes
"'17
Judge Higginbotham's sensitive review of a summary judg-
ment record emerges in Wilmore v. City of Wilmington.'8 That
case involved a firefighter's promotional exam that tested, among
other things, administrative skills for which only whites had re-
ceived training. The city argued successfully in district court that
there was no discrimination because minorities on average still did
better on the full exam. Judge Higginbotham saw the deeper im-
plications of the record. He noted that minorities were conceded
to be qualified for the training they never received, that those who
received training performed best on the exam, and that minorities
would likely have achieved yet higher scores--and thus some of
the coveted promotions-had they been eligible for administrative
training.19
Finally, I might note the case of Levendos v. Stern Entertain-
ment, Inc.,20 in which a plaintiff claimed that gender discrimina-
tion had forced her out of her restaurant job. In finding that there
was a possibility of constructive discharge, Judge Higginbotham
declined to "state as a broad proposition of law that a single non-
trivial incident of discrimination can never be egregious enough to
compel a reasonable person to resign."2 1 (That conclusion faintly
echoed an episode in Judge Higginbotham's own life. As a fresh-
man at Purdue, he appealed to that University's President to ad-
mit black students to the school's dorms instead of relegating them
to unheated, off-campus quarters. The temerarious freshman was
told that the law did not require such accommodations and that, if
he was dissatisfied, he should leave.22 Whether or not this lone ep-
16. 660 F.2d 867 (3rd Cir. 1981).
17. See id. at 878.
18. 699 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 674-75.
20. 860 F.2d 1227 (3rd Cir. 1988).
21. Id. at 1232.
22. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the
American Legal Process vii-viii (1978).
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isode constituted constructive discharge, young Higginbotham
heeded the message and soon transferred to another college.)
As these sample cases demonstrate, Judge Higginbotham has
made the law fulfill its potential while scrupulously respecting its
intended limits. Regardless of outcome, each decision has dis-
played the care and thoroughness that bespeaks respect for all of
the parties. Like the young man in Wordsworth's poem, an opin-
ion by Judge Higginbotham contains within it "a dark inscrutable
workmanship that reconciles discordant elements, makes them
cling together in one society." 23 By demonstrating to all parties
that the law has been fully canvassed and fairly applied, his opin-
ions in these often divisive cases have nevertheless engendered re-
spect for the adjudicatory process.
Judge Higginbotham's public writings explore some of the
questions not encompassed by contemporary lawsuits. Much of his
scholarly work, for example, has brought us closer to understand-
ing the lingering impact of slavery. In particular, of course, his
book In the Matter of Color 24 examines the colonial laws that
treated African Americans as inferior beings (or, worse, as prop-
erty). The book is daunting in scale, having required some ten
years' research into thousands of documents. One can only marvel
at the commitment that sustained Judge Higginbotham's effort
while he worked full-time on the bench and, periodically, in the
classroom, too. "Nothing great," Emerson observed, "was ever
achieved without enthusiasm."25 One concludes that enthusiasm
carried Judge Higginbotham through to the completion of this
book. As he confides in its preface, "I became intensely eager to
acquaint myself with.., the lessons of racial history, to ascertain
to what extent the law itself had created the mores of racial
repression."26
The book lives up to this promised scope, and it is shaped
throughout by the dual outlook-that of the analytic lawyer and
the empathetic observer-that I have mentioned. On the one
hand, Judge Higginbotham the lawyer subtly analyzes the colo-
nies' legal regimes that regulated African Americans. His analysis
reveals law's capacity both to carry out immoral ends and to give
voice to noble aspirations. In some colonies, slaveholders' eco-
nomic interests were protected by a detailed regime of punish-
ments and prohibitions, while other colonies like Pennsylvania
23. William Wordsworth, The Prelude, 53-55 (1850 version)(J.C. Maxwell ed.
1971).
24. Higginbotham, supra note 22.
25. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Circles, in Essays 321 (1904)
26. Higginbotham, supra note 22, at ix.
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were less harsh in subjugating African Americans. 27 Yet even
Pennsylvania, which recognized, in 1780, that "He, who placed
[men of different complexions] in their various situations, hath ex-
tended equally [H]is care and protection to all,"28 nevertheless
granted legal protection to slavery for another 28 years.29 Thus, at
the very moment that America issued its Declaration of Indepen-
dence, not one colonial judge or legislature would extend that doc-
ument's basic precept-that "all men are created equal"-to
America's black inhabitants. 30
Judge Higginbotham the humane observer reminds us that
"the language of the law shields one's consciousness from ... the
stark plight of its victims,"3 ' and that, distant as it may be, this
pre-Revolutionary history helps us to understand how, "through
the legal process, racial injustice was further perpetuated" for
most of the next two centuries.32 indeed, much of Judge Higgin-
botham's other writings have attempted to relate the history of le-
galized injustice to the modern era. At a bicentennial celebration,
he reminded his audience that the Constitution was only recently
given life for all Americans. 33 In his Pound Conference lecture on
reform of judicial administration, he cautioned against the type of
docket clearance that would withdraw access to the courts-access
that has been crucial in reversing centuries of discrimination.34 In
commemorating the Harvard Law Review's centennial,35 he noted
that the Review's early editors did not even comment on the
Supreme Court's lamentable decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.36
Judge Higginbotham counseled today's Review editors that "law-
yers [should] evaluate how successful we have been as a profession
in moving towards the goal of social and legal justice for all," and
that "[e]ach lawyer must consciously and constantly assess his or
her values and goals in forging rules of law for the future."37
In reflecting upon the work of distinguished judges, I am
27. Compare id. at 151-215 (discussing the treatment of slaves in South Carolina
with id. at 267-310 (discussing the treatment of slaves in Pennsylvania).
28. Id. at 301.
29. Id. at 302.
30. See id. at 268 & n.3, 313.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 16.
33. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Bicentennial of the Constitution: A Racial
Perspective, Stan. Law., Fall 1987, at 8.
34. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform,
70 F.R.D. 134, 154 (1976).
35. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment and
Craftsmanship, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 795 (1987).
36. Id. at 808.
37. Id. at 815.
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sometimes reminded of Edmund Burke's exhortation to an English
audience. "It is . .. our business," he said, "[t]o bring the disposi-
tions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of
the commonwealth." s Judge Higginbotham possesses an abun-
dance of "lovely dispositions": an inquiring mind, a commitment to
fairness, a compassion for those ill-treated, and a determination to
see their condition changed. We are fortunate indeed that he re-
solved to "bring th[ese] dispositions . . .into the service and con-
duct of the commonwealth." His example has surely spurred
others to harness their energy and vision to the public good. I
know it will continue to do so for decades to come.
38. Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents 115 (5th
ed. 1775).

